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Restructuring of Ural Enterprises and Changes in the Internal Labor Market: 
A Sociological Perspective 
 




The internal labor market is a field where the employer and the employees interact within 
an organization, this field being similar in its functions to the ordinary external labor market, that 
is, it determines the cost of manpower, and the staff movements within the enterprise, which 
include both horizontal and vertical mobility. The processes analyzed by economists within the 
framework of the concept of the internal labor market are studied in sociology as processes of 
intra-organizational mobility: its factors, trajectories, and the ascent opportunities of its staff [1, 
2]. 
Western sociology and management with its long-standing tradition of studying intra-
firm mobility has come up with several models of it, these models of mobility depending on the 
rules and norms that determine the ascent of employees within the enterprise. Turner [3] pointed 
out two types of intra-organizational mobility: Contest with its competition of experience and 
abilities on equal terms to occupy the next higher post, and the protectionist or sponsored one, 
when leaders are discerned very early and their chances of ascent within the organization 
increase. Rosenbaum [4], who developed these ideas and partly combined the models, offered a 
“tournament model”, the essence of which is that career within the organization is based on the 
principle of “a drop-out competition”, where everyone has an equal chance in the first stage, but 
the next stages are only for those who “won” the previous ones. That is, the higher the post you 
occupy, the more important is the experience of the previous successful positional ascents. 
Models of enterprise mobility do not fully depend on changes in the external labor 
market, demand and supply dynamics or cost of manpower in the economy of the region. To a 
much greater degree the logic of development of the internal labor market is determined by 
administratively fixed formal and informal rules, the practice of labor relations that have formed 
within the enterprise. The “old” Russian enterprises that were in existence prior to the economic 
reforms of the 1990s “inherited” the Soviet system of labor relations with its patronizing, the 
practice of “lifelong” employment, and prevalence of non-financial mechanisms of labor 
incentives. But the restructuring that all more or less successful modern enterprises had to go 
through under the influence of “market pressure” actually changed the “rules of the game” in the 
internal labor market. The interaction of restructuring processes and changes in the internal labor 
markets and, as a result, the flow of internal mobility, are to be the subject of study in this paper.   2
The research has been carried out in accordance with case study methodology where we 
have used various methods of collecting information: analysis of documents that pertain to 
personnel policy, the development strategy of an enterprise; the formation and analysis of a data 
base on personnel ascents as they are reflected in personnel department documentation; in-depth 
interviews with managers of various levels and sectors, with rank-and-file employees; structured 
interviews with selected employees that represent the enterprise structure. Case study is a 
research strategy the aim of which is a deep and complex analysis of the social phenomenon 
where an individual empiric subject – a case, is taken as an example [5, 6]. The subject of our 
study is the enterprise, and the method of case study is ideal for the analysis of restructuring 
processes and changes in the internal labor market within a certain period of time with its 
complex interactions between various levels of management. 
 
The reasons why we chose certain enterprises were the following: they were established 
in the Soviet period and in the 2000s underwent important organizational and managerial 
restructuring. We have chosen two “old” Ural enterprises as the subject of our research. These 
two enterprises belong to different branches of industry and this factor makes it possible for us to 
name them “Khimzavod” (chemical factory) and “Mashzavod” (machine-building factory). Both 
factories were established in the 1940s-50s and have a lot in common. Manpower at these 
enterprises does not exceed the average, numbering not more than 1000 persons. To note, both 
enterprises have decreased the number of personnel compared to the Soviet period – now there 
are 4 to 5 times less employees. This factor is connected with the depression that took place in 
the early mid-1990s. However, today these factories have been modernized, at any rate, we see 
many attributes of “advanced” management: significant effort and means have been put into 
investment and purchasing of up-to-date machinery, the enterprises have been certified by ISO, 
their top management has undergone study in updated business schools, etc. 
Both factories began their active development period in the early 2000s together with all 
of Russia’s economy, but the conditions for this development had begun to form earlier: it was in 
the early 1990s that both enterprises introduced a number of managerial innovations that we can 
conventionally call “a turn towards the market”, which actually was the beginning of a 
significant restructuring process. But these processes and their consequences, for the internal 
labor market including, turned out to be absolutely different in the two factories that we studied. 
From the point of view of research we were extremely lucky in that our analysis gave us the 
possibility to describe two different restructuring models, two different approaches as to how to 
transform “the Soviet legacy”. One variant (Mashzavod) gave us an example of an attempt to 
combine a “market” orientation and an updated management structure with what was in fact the   3
Soviet system of labor relations and, in particular, a model of the internal labor market. The other 
variant (Khimzavod) totally rejected Soviet practice and actively introduced Western 
management set-ups with their practice of internal ascent, evaluation and incentives for 
employees. 
Both of these restructuring models will be described in detail in this paper and, as we see 
it, they are indicative for contemporary Russian enterprises. We have taken only two cases for 
our research, but our colleagues have registered similar processes in their studies of other 
contemporary Russian enterprises [7, 8]. 
Though both factories have quite a number of features of development in common, the 
differences that most probably influence the strategic priorities are rather significant. Khimzavod 
has been in private hands since the mid-1990s and is a closed joint-stock company. Mashzavod, 
on the other hand, is an open joint-stock company, which by the way keeps to the rules of 
corporate openness, though it is partly state property, the state being the major shareholder. 
The clients of these two enterprises are very different. Khimzavod works mainly with the 
dynamically developing food industry. Mashzavod, on the other hand, has a considerable share 
of state orders, its other consumers being large machine-building enterprises. It is this difference 
that has created the different situations in the enterprises in conditions of the economic crisis and 
it is this factor that has to be taken into account because the research was carried out in the spring 
and summer of 2009. Practically speaking, Khimzavod did not have to decrease its production 
capacities, whereas Mashzavod suffered a rather hard setback when sales dropped drastically and 
the typical for Russian enterprises anti-crisis measures had to be introduced: working hours were 
cut, bonuses were minimized, partial staff reductions took place (not en masse). However, we 
have not focused our studies on the crisis processes, though they most certainly have exerted a 
great influence on the situation in the factories, on the functioning of the internal labor markets 
in particular. 
So this paper includes the results of the study of changes in both of these Ural enterprises 
in the period from 1990 through 2000. The first section is devoted to the restructuring processes 
and their influence on changes in personnel policies, which help us to understand the conditions 
and factors that led to changes in the labor market. The second section analyzes the changes in 
the internal labor market and the processes of their intraorganizational mobility. 
 
Restructuring Processes and Changes in Personnel Policy 
 In the past two decades restructuring processes at Russian enterprises have gone hand in 
hand both with the reproduction of personnel management models at Soviet enterprises and the 
formation of new practices in the sphere of personnel policies.   4
Changes in the staff structure of enterprises and the introduction of new forms of 
management took place in a rather contradictory and inconsistent way. As studies [9, 10] show, 
it was stipulated by the very nature of compulsory privatization of state enterprises in the 1990s, 
and a significant divergence in the declared and the actual development priorities of Russia’s 
economy in the post-Soviet period. It is of interest to note that it was the strategic priorities of 
restructuring of enterprises that primarily determined the specificity of transformation in 
personnel policies. 
In the past two decades the development of Russian enterprises has undergone a number 
of periods that differ as far as their priority aims and the strategy of their realization are 










Both of the studied enterprises have gone along the same path. This is obvious not only 
from official documents that registered their activity: annual accounts, sectional statistics, the 
content of the factory periodicals, reminiscences of factory employees – all this was similar 
rhetoric.  
So we may say that the typical economic strategy of Russia’s industrial enterprises till the 
late 1990s was that of survival: how to keep alive the production process in conditions of a 
severe financial deficit when previously formed economic ties were disrupted, the 
reduction/suspension of state orders, etc. The words “disorganization”, “break-up”, “survival” - 
are the key ones in our discourse describing this period.  
Employees simply began to quit, to flee. Some of them found something else to do. 
Many left. Quite a number fell prey to an unfortunate fate. Even among those who were 
shop managers. They began to drink. That is to say that everything began to fall apart 
(The first deputy production director-general, working there since 1974 – Mashzavod). 
A total disintegration, as I see it, the accounting system, the production process, 
everything (rank-and-file specialist, Khimzavod). 
 
1. Survival 
strategy (1990 – 
early 2000s) 
2. Strategy of adapting 
to work in conditions 
of market (early 2000s 
– 2008) 
3. Strategy of maintaining 
the positions achieved 
(2008-2009)   5
Survival aims determine the main direction of management, of personnel management 
among others – that is the search of means for the current needs of the enterprise, wages being 
among them. 
The task was to evacuate (prior to 2003) the premises and lease them so as to be able to 
at least pay the employees, preferably in money form. We began to sell our unused equipment, to 
lease the premises, that is to search for and find inner reserves. (Deputy production director-
general, working there since 1998, Mashzavod). 
As everywhere else, we got our wages in the form of commodities. We sold them 
ourselves. The factory set up a place nearby for us to sell the products, it was there that we sold 
the products, then we handed out the money to the people (long-standing employee – rate-fixer, 
Khimzavod). 
 
Staff management in these conditions functioned in accordance with the situation, 
spontaneously. Personnel were not viewed as a significant resource in the conditions of the 
survival strategy of the enterprise, the necessity for personnel policy was not articulated by top 
management. At both enterprises the personnel department was on the periphery of their 
organizational structure and carried out only registration functions: employment, dismissal, etc. 
Management of personnel practice was mainly oriented towards the forced minimization 
of the number of employees and decrease of the expenses of maintaining them: labor conditions, 
“social welfare”, etc. 
First, we lost quite a bit of social welfare… The factory had its own kindergartens, 
dispensaries, polyclinic. People could during working hours go to the polyclinic – all the 
specialists were there. They could go to a dispensary, the factory is a chemical one, it’s 
dangerous for your health. Now nothing of this is left and we don’t pay for the kindergarten. 
That is, nothing of social welfare except sick leaves or holiday leaves is left (rank-and-file 
specialist, Khimzavod). 
 
There were no mass reductions, but the tactics characteristic of the period was 
“provocation of self-dismissal” of employees, especially there where manpower was not needed 
[10]. It is this period that is noted for its high flow of manpower, the qualified being among 
them, plus the absence of any kind of thought-out policy for preserving manpower, with a total 
disruption of social security guarantees for the staff. The number of employees became 4 to 5 
times less at the enterprises that we studied. 
As a compensation mechanism for those highly traumatic personnel situations the 
management of the enterprises tried to employ the patronizing principles of staff management:   6
pressure of authority (“to save the factory”, “to save the collective”), unofficial levers of 
management (“friendly support, collectivism”), shutting their eyes on the violation of labor 
discipline, etc. 
Actually the internal labor market fell apart spontaneously and personnel management 
came fully under the control of the various sectors of the enterprises and was determined by 
linear managers. 
Of note is the fact that at this time the highest rank of top managers was recruited 
exclusively according to the protectionist principle of “having my friends and acquaintances in 
the team”. The work of such managers was mostly of an emergency type and the task was to 
“keep alive” the endangered positions. 
“I was summoned to the director-general who said, “Remember we agreed to 
work where there was an emergency, so look into the leasing, and now I’d like you to 
look into all the accounting, you’ll be my head accountant. I was deputy economic 
manager, deputy personnel manager, deputy development manager. So here we have this 
row of appointments. (Deputy production director-general, working since 1998, 
Mashzavod). 
 
The early 2000s saw a general improvement in the economic situation of the country 
(growth of market activity, development of business crediting) with changes in strategic aims 
and at that moment the second restructuring stage started its progress at the industrial enterprises. 
The specific feature of this strategic stage was that it institutionally consolidated the results of 
the previous period of spontaneous survival of enterprises and was directed towards the active 
growth of business in conditions of the market. Here again we see a change of aims and practices 
of personnel policy at the enterprises, which now is determined by the design of industrial 
restructuring and management structures. 
The management of those enterprises, which was able to find markets for their products 
by the early 2000s or to diversify production, came to consider as its aim a further restructuring 
and stabilization of the achieved successes in marketing by updating their production capacities, 
learning to work with new technologies, raising the productivity of labor, optimizing the 
organizational structures of the enterprise. It is this road that both the said enterprises took, a 
factor that was reflected both in the rhetoric of their declared aims and in the direction of the 
restructuring that they followed. 
In spite of the fact that each enterprise chose its own restructuring plan, there were 
several points that they had in common:   7
  To continue actively looking for new markets and ways of diversifying 
production. 
  To raise the status of those sectors that work with counteragents of the 
market: the sales department, the advertising department. 
  To transform significantly the organizational structure of the enterprise, its 
fractioning, to give more economic and financial independence to the aims set by 
production. 
  To adapt the industrial and technological resources and personnel 
management to the demands of consumer markets. Restructuring is to be directed 
towards the client. 
  To raise the significance of personnel in the restructuring process of the 
enterprise, to work out a personnel-aimed policy, to raise the status of the 
personnel department. 
 
Special note should be made here of the rhetoric of this strategic period. The key 
words used in the documentation of the enterprises and in the texts of the interviews with 
employees point out very clearly the tasks set by restructuring: “to preserve the markets 
occupied”, “to ensure stability”, “flexibility”, “effectiveness of business”, “investments 
into development”, “produced commodities should fully correspond to the client’s 
demands”, “qualification competence certified according to European standards of 
quality”, etc. 
By 2003 we had already occupied certain markets… occupied a certain niche. 
Then came the most difficult situation when we had to keep those markets, and it was 
here that we needed a leadership as far as expenses were concerned (deputy production 
director-general, Mashzavod). 
 
In the years from 2003 to 2007 Mashzavod had set up a holding and fractioned its 
business into separate economic sections that came under the united direction of the 
holding. Here we see that the setting up of each branch of the enterprise is accompanied 
by changes in its organizational structure and the reshuffling of personnel in the head 
enterprise of the holding. 
Of special importance for me is the great number of reorganizations. Sometimes 2 
or 3 a year. Most of the reorganizations concern production trends being turned into 
separate juristic units” (Head of the Economics Section, Mashzavod). 
   8
The main aim of restructuring is the increase of flexibility and competitiveness of each 
direction and minimizing the expenses. In addition to changes in the organizational structure, 
restructuring was also concerned with a renewal of the process of production, the purchasing of 
new equipment and assimilation of the know-how of new technologies. The new equipment 
made in the West required a more scrupulous attitude towards raw materials. At the same time 
clients began to demand higher standards of quality. 
 
All these changes required a new look at the status of the staff of the restructured 
enterprises. Besides the articulation of the problem of working out a thought-out personnel 
policy and raising the status of the personnel department the top management of the enterprises 
formulated the timely task of increasing the personnel potential of the said enterprises by 
providing the main directions of production with qualified manpower, by setting up a reserve of 
manpower and strengthening the managing staff. 
We concentrated all our strength mainly on the formation of a personnel service. 
Previously we had a personnel department. The head of this department took care of all 
the aspects. Now we have two directions – personnel management and its instruction. It 
was important to raise the qualifications. The technical part of the work was mainly 
concentrated in the sector, which worked with personnel. The intellectual component is in 
the sector that manages the personnel (Superintendent of the Security Maintenance, till 
2007 was head of the personnel service, Mashzavod). 
 
The director-general of the holding and the heads of the branches undertook steps to 
attract young specialists and get them “rooted” in the enterprises and to form a personnel reserve 
of qualified specialists from among the employees of the enterprise:  
  Selection of young specialists, graduates of colleges and universities of the 
city, visits to vacancy fairs, 
  Setting up favorable conditions for young specialists: a relatively high 
salary, partial payments for rented accommodation, 
  Refreshment courses at the expense of the enterprise within the system of 
professional training in the city, attracting consulting firms, etc. 
  Changes in the way medium-level technical managers are employed – a 
change from protectionist recruiting to the contest one. 
 
The attitude of the top-ranking management towards the employment of medium-
level technical personnel is that they promote their employees. That is they educate their   9
employees. A lot of attention is given to that, young people are valued highly at our 
enterprise. 
And the factory pays a lot of attention to instructing the young staff potential. All 
kinds of trainings are held, the director-general invites some kind of agencies all the 
time, companies that instruct (Head of the Construction Bureau, Mashzavod). 
We went to institutes and told them what they would get if they came to work here. 
We had such a period when young fellows came and they were given salaries higher than 
those received by people who had worked here for 40 years or more, specialists of the 
first category (Chairman of the Trade Union, Mashzavod). 
 
The results of the research make it possible for us to state that the nature of the 
transitional economy is reflected in the personnel policy. The solution of strategic tasks of 
raising the level of internal competitiveness of enterprises is combined with the rather costly as 
far as resources are concerned model of management of personnel that was characteristic for 
Soviet enterprises – the absence of a formalized order of employing personnel, the standardized 
mechanism of intra-firm evaluation of the qualification competence of the staff within the 
enterprises, fixation of staff training functions in the hands of the linear manager, the prevalence 
of informal mechanisms of solving labor conflicts, pressure on the staff in emergency cases (with 
emphasis on the non-material motivators, informal relations), etc. A telling phrase: “All that we 
had in the Soviet period, it is all still here because there were many good things at that time, 
that’s what I think” (deputy manager for production, Mashzavod). 
 
The role of the trade union is also to be noted. On the one hand, it carries out its usual 
functions concerned with sport and entertainment, but on the other hand, it tries to stand up for 
the rights of the working people that are in the Collective Agreement, it takes part in settling 
labor conflicts. 
Sometimes they call me personally. People know already that it’s enough for me 
just to speak to someone. So I go and settle it with any employer they want, and I don’t go 
to the director, I go to the man who is in charge of that question. If it concerns finances, I 
go to the one who is in charge of finances, if it concerns personnel, I go to the personnel 
department. And it must be said that all these people try to help, I find a common tongue 
with everyone (Chairman of the Trade Union, Mashzavod). 
   10
In its attempt to settle the tasks of restructuring industry in accordance with the strategy 
of business development and the increase of profit, the second enterprise, Khimzavod, has 
chosen a different, but also a very contradictory model of personnel management. 
The key principles, on which the personnel policy is being built today, may be identified 
as a refusal to employ the costly “pro-Soviet” forms of personnel management (patronizing the 
workers, “preserving the work collective”) and the formation of a rational personnel structure of 
the enterprise directed towards the production of commodities that can be sold in a competitive 
market (the effective work of the right number of highly-qualified workers). 
A change in the orientation of the personnel policy has found its reflection in the rather 
noticeable rise of the status of personnel service and in the words of people who speak about it. 
The personnel department has been transformed into a department of personnel management, 
which is directly in answer to the director-general. Functionally speaking, the department has in 
its work combined the registration of staff movement, the instruction of staff and the 
management of quality. Of note may be the interview with employees of the department and 
those who are in charge of its documentation – “management of qualification”, “management of 
motivation”, “management of quality”. 
The main declared aims of personnel policy are: 
  Raising of the value of manpower, that is the professional competency of 
the employees, and the orientation of its working motivation towards the clients; 
  Raising of the efficiency of the work of the personnel as an advantage in 
competition; 
  Raising the organizational transparency of business as a whole, and of 
those questions that concern personnel management in particular, standardization, 
personnel management, formalizing the procedure of employment, staff 
reshuffling, etc.; 
  Lowering of irrational costs of manpower that are not oriented directly 
towards labor efficiency and quality of the commodities produced. 
 
To put into practice the first two aims a number of measures were undertaken at the 
enterprise: a system of permanent training was introduced with a course “Ready for the Future” 
aimed at forming professional competency and understanding each production cycle as a whole 
and the tasks of each sector in the production of quality products. Instruction has been organized 
in the form of cycles: the manager of the sector works out and conducts the instructive program 
pertaining to labor functions and technological processes for employees in his sector, as well as 
for those who work in other sectors.   11
 
In addition to that a program of adaptation of new workers in the main production sectors 
has been introduced for those working there, the aim of which is to help these people get the 
know-how on new equipment. 
 I have my own teaching programs. Here you see wasters. For three years I have been 
piling them up. The young workers are taught only here – this kind of defect, that kind (shop 
manager, Khimzavod). 
 
The introduction of the Japanese system “Kaidzen” as an incentive to stimulate the 
innovating activity of employees of all levels is aimed at raising the working efficiency of the 
personnel.   
Standardization of personnel management is mainly connected with the introduction of 
regular checks of qualification competence of the personnel with the following changes in 
ascent, a factor that will help minimize the protectionist model of career ascent. Together with 
qualification competence the managers of the enterprise strive to increase internal 
competitiveness by forming a reserve of workers that would consist of loyal and highly qualified 
specialists. 
What I didn’t like most of all was the absence of a system of personnel reserve, a system 
of growth. Now it is being developed. The question does not concern the managers, it 
concerns people who have a definite competency level and are loyal to the factory… We 
have pointed out those key employees that are to undergo training in those sectors that 
are in need of good workers (Director of Finances, Khimzavod). 
 
Thus, as far as the training system of the personnel is concerned when quality is to be in 
accordance with the strategic orientation of the stable development of business, the leadership of 
the enterprise behaves effectively and consistently. The rank-and-file employees welcome this 
kind of activity because it helps to raise labor discipline. 
We have a service that controls quality, we often do it ourselves. Demands grow as well. 
Clients want more now. Earlier, for example, a defect like this would be here (he shows the 
defect on the final product) and we wouldn’t even notice it. Now it’s a waster, that’s all. We 
select the better ones, the client doesn’t want to get the bad ones (qualified worker, Khimzavod). 
All good-for-nothings, drunkards, idlers – I have tried to get rid of them. There were 
quite a number of them. I think I fired the last idler who didn’t turn up at work regularly 
somewhere in 2007. When I began to control this, I left the good young people who worked well 
here, I fired the rest (shop manager, Khimzavod).   12
 
At the same time the processes of formalizing the management of the internal labor 
market at Khimzavod went together with a rather rigid policy of personnel reduction and 
minimization of non-profile costs: rejection of the so-called social sphere (benefits), cancellation 
of social welfare and material help, etc. The enterprise has no trade union now, which means that 
there is no collective agreement. 
When we began the reductions, it took us a long time to figure out how it was going to be. 
We came to a decision that we have to cut 10% off each sector. The sectors performed the task. 
We made the cut – the personnel decreased? The work is still done? The tasks are carried out? 
So let’s make another 10% cut. Then we’ll see (Director of Finances, Khimzavod). 
 
The divergence between the declared principles and the effect of the personnel 
restructuring manifested itself not in the increase, but also in the devaluation of rank-and-file 
employees. This led to a decrease of loyalty when the rank-and-file employees stopped 
understanding the personnel policy of the managers. 
The study has shown that in conditions of transitional economy the rank-and-file 
employees accept the introduction of new corporate standards of personnel management, the 
formalized set-ups of selecting personnel, management of routine and methods of labor, but they 
are not ready for the headlong destruction of patronizing models of interaction within the 
enterprise, which create alienation between them and the leadership of the enterprise. It was this 
situation that we found in the second enterprise that we analyzed. 
I think that the attitude towards us at present is very indifferent. It seems that it is 
not important what kind of person you are, what you feel. Earlier, every shop manager 
knew everything about his worker. Now they don’t care. The main thing is that they (the 
workers) work and fulfill the plan (worker who had worked for many years at the factory, 
Khimzavod). 
 
Our studies have shown that employees of both enterprises are in general satisfied with 
their work, they are sure of the stability of the enterprise and that they are wanted, they value the 
relations that have formed in the collective. However, these positive evaluations at the 
enterprises differ. 
At Mashzavod loyalty to the enterprise is formed mainly due to the preservation of the 
managerial vertical of the patronizing model of personnel management. 
At Khimzavod we see that the attitude towards the employees of the enterprise is 
contradictory: manpower has come to be more valued, loyalty of personnel is formed by the   13
leadership only when it is necessary to solve production tasks. Emotional comfort, job security 
has been recreated and maintained on the level of workers’ collectives mostly in the main 
production sectors. It is not accidental that the lowest rate of loyalty is shown by employees of 
subsidiary production sectors. 
 
Internal Labor Markets and Intra-organizational Regulators of Mobility 
An enterprise may be viewed as an institute of mobility, a very important one that to a 
great degree determines social class differences in industrial and late-industrial society [11]. 
Ascent of employees in the internal labor market take place along two main axes of mobility: 
professional (career) and the economic one (which means a change in pay) [12]. As an institute 
of mobility the enterprise may be viewed in two aspects: structurally, from the point of view of 
the ascent possibilities that it gives - the number of positions, their complexity and the multi-
layered structure of management and the posts to be held there, plus its dynamics. Second, the 
enterprise may be viewed as a field of formation and action of rules that regulate the ascent of its 
employees. To be more exact, the determining ones: who is to be selected for promotion, what 
personal or professional criteria are important for ascent in the internal labor market, what the 
employees may be punished or dismissed for. Some of these rules are fixed formally while 
others are formed by everyday practice of interaction that determines the chances of 
intraorganizational mobility for each employee. 
If to speak of the structure of the factories that we have studied, on the whole, it is 
similar. Both enterprises have a three-level management structure with linear management on the 
lowest level (foreman, team-leader), medium-level management (shop and sector managers) and 
top management. Functional division is typical: production is separated from the sales and the 
administrative sections, and there is division into the main production process and the subsidiary 
services. 
It is of interest to note that in the process of restructuring both factories tried in a greater 
or lesser degree to introduce elements of matrix structure. Khimzavod introduced divisional 
structure with a certain degree of independence for the divisions by letting them have their own 
sales sector and index of economic effectiveness. Later, however, the idea was abandoned. 
Mashzavod went even further by forming independent juristic units out of some of the sectors, 
but leaving the internal labor market common for all so as managers could move from one 
enterprise to another, and new managers could be recruited from “neighboring” structures, this 
being the usual practice. In the long run the institutional framework of mobility at the enterprises 
is determined by the traditional hierarchic structure built along functional lines.   14
A management structure of this type to a great degree determines the specificity of the 
internal labor market at Russian factories: a barrier between the production and the non-
production sectors is one of their features. One can actually speak about different labor markets 
for each of these categories of employees, where internal mobility, as a rule, is limited by the 
framework of its own professional group that occupies certain posts. 
A configuration of management structure such as this gives the widest possible career 
possibilities  for  the  employees  of  the  main  sector  of  production. To begin with, it is 
connected with the longest “staircase” that includes qualification competence categories and 
possibility of growth along the line team-leader – foreman / shift foreman – shop manager. Our 
studies revealed such career growths, both in the Soviet period and just recently. However, we 
noticed a rather significant difference between the factories. Mashzavod has quite a number of 
such “old” careers, whereas Khimzavod has new ones. One bright example for both enterprises 




Career begun in 1974, became foreman in the Soviet period, then after graduating became 
shop manager. In the 1990s when many people quit the factory, young managers were promoted, 
those who were able to work in the new conditions. Our protagonist becomes deputy head 
manager of production and monitors one of the main production lines. Then he continues to hold 
this post when the production line becomes a separate branch. He holds this post up to this day. 
Khimzavod: 
Came to the factory in 2001, still quite young (40). Employed as a qualified worker, 
however there being one important point - with higher education and experience in the military 
sphere. Next year saw him promoted to higher posts, he becomes a medium-level manager 
(bypassing the stage of linear management), the latest reorganization brings him the post of 
deputy director-general. 
 
Most certainly there are not many examples of careers like this, but we can definitely 
state that production managers are recruited more often from among the inner resources: “here 
in production all these managers used to be workers, that is, they come from the same social 
layer… that’s why the attitude is still the same, liberal sort of” (foreman, Khimzavod). Of note is 
the fact that most of the linear managers in the main production at Khimzavod were actually all 
substituted in the matter of a very short time in connection with one of the many reorganizations 
at the beginning of 2009. Another variant that we saw at Mashzavod is when some of the   15
managers, productions managers among them, came to the enterprise with the new director-
general to become part of his team. But even in this case many of the former managers stay 
(practically impossible for the economic management – the financial staff, economists, those 
who “sell” are usually substituted). 
The enterprises that we have studied have good mobility chances for the production 
personnel due to the specificity of their sphere of work: as we have already noted, both 
enterprises underwent difficulties when searching for production specialists in the external labor 
market. That is why both factories deliberately stimulate internal mobility of the main production 
personnel by introducing specialized programs to help develop these workers: a reserve of 
personnel (Khimzavod) and support for the young employees (Mashzavod).  
In addition to vertical mobility, which is rather limited for this category of employees, we 
can make note of the privileged position of the highly qualified production personnel. They are 
instructed, so they feel that they are important and valued. 
As a result, it is the production personnel that are mobile, especially at Khimzavod. 
Analysis of the database of the personnel department sheds light on certain tendencies of internal 
mobility of various categories of employees. The maximum mobility level was noted in the main 
production sectors of Khimzavod – 70.4% of the employees of these sectors survived the 
upheavals of the 2000s. Mashzavod shows a similar tendency but with a bit less mobility – 
52.6% (see Table 1). However, at both factories half of the transfers of workers have to do with 
ascent. 
At Khimzavod the system of giving the workers a higher rank is of a regular and 
systematized nature – each year they go through a planned qualification competence test, which 
includes an exam in theory and a task, with their immediate superiors and colleagues giving 
them references. If the result of the qualification competence test is good they may be given a 
higher rank: 
If you want to raise your qualification level here, you have at least to pass a test. 
This testing gives you a possibility to apply for a higher rank. And of course then you will 
be paid more” (worker, Khimzavod). 
 
Qualification competence testing is viewed by everyone, rank-and-file employees 
included, as a fair and transparent mechanism for personnel ascent. It helps to control 
qualification and opens the way for the career ascent of the employee. 
Qualification competence testing confirms your rank or shows whether it should 
be raised. There could be a lowering of the rank if the worker spoils the commodity he 
produces regularly. If a person has a high rank and spoils the commodity time after time,   16
we’ve had such cases where it is obvious – inattention, inaccuracy, then he goes through 
a qualification competence test not provided for by the plan (shop manager, Khimzavod). 
 
Mashzavod has no system of testing qualification competence, but you can apply for a 
higher rank: “we have a tariff and qualification commission, it gives you a rank and the person 
comes having a certain rank, which is confirmed” (worker, Mashzavod). Here we may point out 
that in the conditions of a crisis the raising of ranks is not stimulated, it is even impeded. That is, 
theoretically, such a possibility does exist, but in practice ranks are not raised: “A test in 
qualification competence is a motivation: if you go through it you raise your rank and your pay. 
At present the enterprise has no such possibility. On the contrary, the task is to reduce wages” 
(head of personnel department, Mashzavod). 
 
Table 1. Mobility level of personnel at the factories from 2000 to 2009*. 
 KHIMZAVOD  МASHZAVOD   




transfers per one 
mobile person 




transfers per one 
mobile person 
Employees of factory 
taken as a whole  47,5 1,8 41,4 1,9 
Main production 
process  70,4  1,7  52,6  1,9 
Subsidiary production 
process  29,9 1,2 21,6 1,8 
Specialists in 
administrative sectors  35,0 1,4 46,8  2,0 
* A study of the personal records of the employees, the material from the personnel department, only the 
vertical transfers were recorded when a person occupied a new post, or received another category or rank (for 
workers). 
 
One more category of personnel that is mobile – the specialists. 
Mashzavod is the place where specialists have good chances of mobility. There one can 
see a clearly protectionist position towards young specialists. This trend is a deliberate policy, 
which began to show itself in the early 2000s, when ageing of personnel at the enterprise became 
a problem. It was at that time that the decision to attract and keep young specialists was taken. 
The management looks for them among school leavers, a special program to support the young 
specialists has been created (we have mentioned this fact already). “Rapid” career ascent is 
characteristic for young specialists who came to this factory. Here is an example: 
 
Mashzavod, manager of construction sector of one of the work directions:   17
Came to the factory while still a student in 2004 as engineer-constructor. Ascent due to 
activity, motivations high, was good organizer: “the first time I was promoted was because… the 
sector manager that was here before me needed some kind of administrative help on questions of 
interaction. He was more of a man of science… so he made me his assistant, so I got a new post, 
I became the deputy sector manager. After that it all went naturally, I had to look into quite a 
number of questions, to go places on business, work with clients, etc.” 
This example is possibly the most striking, but it is quite typical for enterprises – the 
2000s saw a great many managers being changed. For some of them these transfers turned out to 
be rather intensive – when sectors were separated and became branches of the enterprise these 
people became their directors (such was the case with the sector of electronic advertising, the 
sector of computer technologies). It is significant that restructuring opened up new possibilities 
for careers of specialists – sectors were reorganized, some directions of work and the sectors that 
went with them were developed, they grew in size and it was in these conditions that the young 
and energetic specialists ascended. However, as the employees think, this period came to an end 
very quickly, and at present the “top” for specialists is manager of sector: “at that period when 
we had all those reorganizations, there were possibilities for career growth, but now, these last 2 
years… I have a feeling that “the green light” has somehow faded. Actually that’s true, because 
reorganizations have stopped” (sector manager, Mashzavod).  
 
The attitude towards specialists at Khimzavod is quite different – they are not viewed by 
the management as a social policy priority: we have personnel with a standard qualification – 
lawyers, accountants. They do not interest us too much at the moment. We are interested in the 
production personnel”(top manager, Khimzavod). Besides that, there is a practice of hiring 
sector managers from the outside, the same goes for managers of non-production directions 
(personnel department, sales department, financial department, etc.). This means that career 
possibilities are at the very start limited for specialists working at the enterprise because they are 
excluded from contests to occupy vacant posts of sector managers. The same goes for the sector 
managers themselves because they see no perspectives of growth. One of the departments of the 
enterprise may be cited as an example: 
Khimzavod, economics department. 
Sector manager, been working since 2003, was taken to occupy post of manager. Prior to 
that took part as a consultant in the reorganization of the factory, was taken on when work on the 
project was over. 
There are constant changes in the staff of the sector. The policy of hiring consists of new 
specialists without work experience being chosen from the external labor market, their pay is   18
low. Nobody does anything to make them more loyal to the enterprise, the management is 
indifferent to the constant change of employees in the sector: “young girls were taken on as 
economists, sometimes without any experience whatsoever… their pay was low, but that’s how 
they learned, they acquired experience. In about three years’ time they quit, some stayed longer, 
they quit and found better-paid jobs”. 
 
Thus we see that intra-firm mobility for specialists at the enterprises that we studied is 
quite at variance: at Mashzavod there is a stronger tendency towards internal employment of 
managers of sectors and career growth for specialists is stimulated. At Khimzavod, on the other 
hand, professional ascent for specialists is considerably limited both by the general attitude of the 
management towards this category of personnel and by the practice of employing managers of 
sectors from the outside. The result is clearly seen in the transfer statistics (see Table 2): at 
Mashzavod the 2000s witnessed a change of post for practically half the specialists with one 
mobile person having about two transfers. At Khimzavod change of posts was recorded only for 
a third of the specialists, the average number of transfers being 1.4. It is important to note that for 
this category of personnel career possibilities are valuable from the professional point of view, as 
is the criteria of evaluating the place of work, which our research shows: at Mashzavod it is the 
specialists who are to a great degree satisfied with their work (85% are satisfied or almost 
satisfied). At Khimzavod the specialists are less satisfied than the production personnel and the 
reason they give is low pay and the absence of growth perspectives within the enterprise (this 
reason was given as the main one by 1/5 of the specialists). 
Workers of the subsidiary sphere of production are on the periphery of the internal 
labor market. 
Both studied enterprises actually do not see this category of personnel as being of interest for the 
personnel policy they pursue. Of course, this category of personnel also has some level of 
mobility (see Table 1), but it is much lower than in the other sectors, and transfers are usually 
connected with the fact that tariffs for certain posts become higher, though responsibilities are 
not much altered due to ascent. 
 
If we are to pass over from the structural conditions of intraorganizational mobility to 
rules and norms that are regulated by the internal labor market, we should first of all stop 
on the system of remuneration, of bonuses and their absence. The common factor for both 
enterprises in this sphere is the differentiation in the ways of fixing incentives for the production 
and the non-production personnel, as well as innovations in the sphere of remunerations that are, 
by the way, directed towards the solution of certain set tasks.   19
Tradition had it that in both factories the workers and the specialists were paid by the 
hour with a permanent unchangeable part being paid regularly according to the tariff or a person 
got paid for the post he/she held, plus the bonus. The ratio of the permanent part and the bonus in 
different sectors was different. What was common for all was that bonuses were paid without the 
real results of work being taken into account. Bonuses were withheld only if rules of discipline 
were seriously broken. 
In the period of adaptation to the new conditions of the market both factories reviewed 
their methods of payment, this factor mainly concerned the production personnel. The aim had 
not changed – the quality of work still served as an incentive, but organizationally the two 
factories solved it in different ways. 
Khimzavod is introducing the KPI system, a system of indexes, which helps to 
differentiate the amount of the bonus: “quality, output, wasters, and discipline, before we had 
simply the bonus. The amount depended on the output and what was agreed upon when they took 
you on, for this category you got so much, for that one that much” (foreman, Khimzavod). The 
new system of pay changes the relations within the internal labor market, because it leads to 
greater economic inequality. Theoretically, now the worker can influence the level of his/her 
remuneration. But there is a disadvantage: most of the workers don’t understand what this new 
system of payment is all about. At any rate right now only 1/3 of the workers in the main 
production sphere (linear managers, mostly) can definitely say that they understand it. On the 
one hand, the situation is typical when innovations are introduced, on the other, the system is 
really complicated – there are several indexes, each of which has its own significance for the 
amount the bonuses size up to. In other words, its transparency and convenience, so obvious to 
the managers, is incomprehensible to the workers and their perception of it as being fair is still a 
big question. 
When the new system of payment was introduced at Khimzavod, the deprived category 
of employees was again the specialists. They do not feel that their pay depends on the results of 
their work: “we always had a system of fixed pay, last year they decided to work out a system of 
motivation for each post, they thought a bit and worked it out, but it has not been introduced” 
(manager of economic department, Khimzavod). Most specialists (actually one in four) feel that 
their pay does not correspond to their qualification and the effort they put into their work. One 
exception is the sales department where the motivation system is clearly defined: “we all have 
corporate bonuses that are aimed at definite set tasks. In addition to corporate bonuses, we all 
like to go bowling, which is also part of it” (sales manager, Khimzavod).   20
Bonuses for top managers include the corporate share (if the sales plan has been fulfilled 
by 96%), and part of the bonus is for your personal gains – participation in projects, for example. 
Besides, combining posts is stimulated, so are refresher courses, knowledge of English, etc. 
Starting from the 2000s Mashzavod has also tried to connect the workers’ wages in the 
main production sphere to the quality of their labor. Actually the system is very simple – you 
might be deprived of your bonus if there are problems with quality of the commodities produced, 
a fact that is registered by the Section of Technical Control, or if the clients complain. 
Our bonus is practically 40% of our wages, 20% of which is for the production 
plan and some other functions, and 20% is for quality. People have got so used to it that 
it is almost like set wages, something you get automatically. People are very seldom 
deprived of their bonus, as a rule… it’s either the product does not pass technical control 
or the client does not accept it, then it happens that the workers are punished (production 
manager, Mashzavod). 
 
That is, the system of paying bonuses to workers does not add any differentiations in 
wages to the traditional one where wages are set according to rank. But here, as with other 
questions, Mashzavod has a non-formalized system – a fund for bonuses with the bonuses being 
distributed by your direct manager. 
We are allowed to use a small part of the whole volume of production. That is, we 
send the made product to the warehouse, the percentage is counted, and we are, say, 
given 30 000 rubles, so we use this money to pay for overtime and other motivations are 
compensated in this way as well (production manager, Mashzavod). 
 
Until recently, the specialists had a similar system of receiving bonuses, but in 2009 it 
was changed in the non-production sectors and now it depends on the results of your work: 20% 
is for corporate results, that is, whether or not the factory received financial means; 10% for the 
results the sector achieved, which actually means that the work at hand is to be done thoroughly 
and evenly, without interruptions. To speak the truth, this type of bonus system does not 
stimulate, it is an undercover to lower the salary of the specialists in conditions of the crisis when 
sales are not too high. That is how quite a number of specialists see it: “the factory managers are 
deprived of bonuses more often than are the production personnel. And mind you, they use 
indexes that they can’t really influence. That is, the situation with bonuses where the criteria are 
sales - quite a number of people are “tied” to them, they can’t exert any influence on the amount 
that is sold” (manager of economics department, Mashzavod).   21
Thus, at the stage of reorganization, which we call “adaptation to the market”, both 
factories began to change their system of payment and bonuses, while trying to solve the 
problem of quality control of the commodities produced and (second) to stimulate the personnel. 
On the whole, the system of payment becomes more market oriented as it starts to depend on 
whether or not the client is satisfied, as well as on the sales. 
As with other questions, Khimzavod follows the path of maximum formalization and 
systematization of the process. At Khimzavod a lot remains on the level of “manual” 
management and depends on medium-level managers. Both factories, however, don’t have 
enough time to put into practice their innovations, due partly to the crisis, and partly to the 
negative way the personnel views the changes. As a result, the switchover to new methods of 
payment does not in effect exert any influence on the development of the internal labor market. 
Changes in payment exert a much greater influence on internal mobility – it is this factor 
that is viewed by the employees as a rise in status, as positive dynamics. As was shown in a 
survey of the personnel of the enterprises, almost all employees of the factories noticed a rise in 
wages during the last three years. At Khimzavod the peak was reached in 2007. This year was 
actually the last when a mass planned 15% increase in pay took place – this system was in action 
for quite a number of years, but in 2008 it was cancelled. Nothing has as yet taken its place and 
there is no total increase of wages, there are only individual changes in the level of payment that 
accompany the movement up the professional “staircase” (see Table 2).  22
Table 2. The reason for increase in payment – the result of surveys of workers, the 
percentage of those who said that there was an increase. 
 Khimzavod  Mashzavod 
Raising of rank  20,3  2,7 
Raising of position  9,5  10,7 
Increase in wages for the good quality of 
my work (rank or position not raised) 
10,8 16,0 
A rise in wages for everyone  52,7  61,3 
Other reasons   6,7  9,3 
Total 100  100 
 
 
Mashzavod has a totally different situation. Wages are never raised en masse at the 
factory. It does sometimes happen that wages are increased for some sectors, which the 
employees think is a rise for everyone, because they usually compare what they get with what 
their nearest colleagues get. It is only the sector managers who know the mechanism of wage 
increases, which in the long run depends on the personal decision of the director-general: that is, 
here again we come across the combination of the authoritarian style of management and of 
attempts to introduce market oriented principles of management. 
It all happens thanks to me, I am the initiator, I write a note in which I ask to 
consider the possibility. In a talk with the head engineer I explain everything, why it is so. 
The head engineer either supports me or says that it’s no use now, because there is no 
possibility, which means that we put it off till the right moment comes. If there is an 
opportunity, we ask the director-general to make the final decision (production manager, 
Mashzavod). 
 
In 2008 quite a number of sectors got an increase in pay according to this principle. 
At the same time individuals could get a rise if the manager put in a word for them, it 
could be for some work done or on the initiative of the worker if he has the courage to speak up 
for himself (this, of course, can be done only by employees who know that they are worth 
something). We have come across such cases in our study as well. Specialists, workers and 
managers may be cited as examples here. 
Thus, employees of both factories more often noted increases in wages en masse 
(“everyone got a rise”). An increase in pay as a personal achievement is seldom recorded. At 
Khimzavod in the last few years such an increase was given to many workers of the main sector, 
this being connected with a rise in rank. At Mashzavod a rise in pay as a result of ascent or for 
personal achievements was felt only by the managers (60% of this group), and much less by   23
specialists (1/3 of the group). At Khimzavod, besides the managers, a rise in pay as a mark of 
personal achievement was noted only by the sales specialists. 
But on the whole the employees do not feel that this differentiation in payment is a just 
one. At Mashzavod only 15%, and at Khimzavod only 20% consider the pay for the work they 
do adequate to the effort they exert and to their qualification. The problem of whether the 
employees think that they are fairly paid or not, and whether they are fairly promoted is very 
important for the formation of the feeling of satisfaction by the work that is done, and for loyalty 
to the enterprise [13].  
One may notice a discrepancy in the way norms are reconsidered, those norms that 
regulate social mobility along the axis of income. Khimzavod, at least on the level of 
declarations, is oriented towards stimulation of individual results, the activity of the workers. 
Now that it has rejected the system of social benefits, and almost all the non-material incentives 
of stimulating the employees, it definitely must introduce the differentiated system of payment 
for the work done and a transparent set-up for increasing pay. However, at present nothing of the 
sort is happening for most categories of workers (exceptions are managers and sales 
departments). 
Meanwhile Mashzavod still retains the system of social benefits, and is, on the whole, 
oriented towards the patronizing attitude to the personnel, and logically speaking it should have 
retained a uniform system of payment and a planned increase of wages en masse. But it is here 
that increase in wages to a great degree depends on the initiative of the worker himself or his 
manager, though the final decision, quite in the patronizing key, is made personally and at the 
moment considered right by the director-general. 
Here we may make the conclusion that restructuring influences the internal labor market 
and intraorganizational mobility is intensified more thanks to structural transformations, and not 
due to a targeted personnel policy. Processes of intraorganizational mobility are strengthened 
mainly in the periods when important technological and organizational changes take place, 
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Diagram 1. Activity of intra-organizational mobility at various periods in the 













































* There is no information on Khimzavod for 1998-1999. 
** Analysis of the personal records of employees, material from the personnel department. Only vertical 
ascent was recorded with change of post, category or rank (for workers). 
 
At Khimzavod internal mobility began in 2005, a year after new equipment had been 
installed. The highest rate of mobility was in 2008 with the beginning of restructuring in 
organization and personnel policy. Here are some typical examples of careers in that period: 
Khimzavod. 
Career during the first period (technological innovations): 
Came to the factory in 2005 as a qualified worker, learned to work with new equipment. 
Production processes developed, new people came and they had to be taught: “people came, my 
experience grew, new, less experienced people came, automatically I became the supervisor. 
Then there appeared the post of color matcher, we had no ranks then. The managers thought up 
ranks for us, then they came up with senior color matcher, then I became a color matcher 
manager, that is foreman of the sector”. 
At present our hero works as foreman of a sector, this last promotion took place in 2008, 
that is, it occurred during the second period, which may be designated as organizational 
restructuring of production processes. This period witnesses the change of practically all the 
production managers, even of the deputy director-general in charge of production processes. An 
example of career growth at that period: 
Came to the factory in 2003 as apprentice to worker, with higher education and work 
experience on various posts, in a year became head of the shift (this may be related to the first 
period). Quit in 2005, went over to rival firm and received a much higher post, in 2006 came 
back as shift manager, in early 2009 appointed manager of one of the directions of production.   25
“For me it was a surprise, I couldn’t even imagine… How did it happen? My manager 
asked me and another fellow to come up to his office. We were shown in and he said – this and 
that, young men, the party lays its hope on you… Where did those who headed this sector go to, I 
don’t know. And I’m not really interested. What I have to do is produce a good product, no 
wasters”. 
 
At Mashzavod mobility began in 1999, a fact that may be tied to change of director-
general and transfers of managers and the formation of a new team. The second stage of mobility 
was in 2003 when organizational restructuring began, which turned the enterprise into a holding. 
Finally, a noticeable increase of ascent takes place in 2007-2008, which is connected with the 
development of new trends and diversification of production. We have already mentioned one of 
the examples of career growth in these years – the career of a young specialist, manager of the 
construction department. To note, the factor that helped to promote him was his active 
participation in bringing a new trend to a commercial level, his ability to set up relations with 
clients. An example of a career of the first period: 
Production manager of the construction subsector, Mashzavod: 
Came to the factory with higher education and work experience as deputy manager of a 
sector. In 1.5-2 years of work the production manager in the main production shop was 
dismissed and our protagonist was asked to occupy this post. 
“He [the former manager], most probably did something the director didn’t like, or his 
qualifications were wrong and he was asked to leave. Then they decided to try me… Why was it 
that I was chosen, I don’t know. I think it was just that I happened to be at hand”. 
 
As we see, examples taken from Mashzavod and from Khimzavod are very similar. In the 
situation when production is developed and technological transformations take place, those 
people who take an active part in the innovations and can switch over to new formats of work are 
promoted. In situations of structural, organizational and managing transformations the most 
important thing is, obviously, education, training, work experience, management included, even 
outside the enterprise. The impression is made that the factor of “a new man” is important, one 
that is not related to the previous managing team, but is loyal to the enterprise. 
The specific feature of Mashzavod is that here they have a team of top managers 
consisting of only a few members, but their internal mobility is very high – they are periodically 
“switched over” to take responsibility for new, often with numerous problems, trends. Here is 
one very good example: 
At present deputy director-general for production, Mashzavod:   26
Came together with new director-general from his old place of work. Worked as manager 
of sales department. Then when sales began to grow was in charge of leasing territory, then our 
hero was appointed head accountant (having no financial or economic education), then head of 
personnel department, then again – back into the production process. 
 
This example (it is not the only one) clearly shows that the factor of loyalty to the 
enterprise and personally to the director-general was the key one, as well as his ability to work in 
the team and carry out all kinds of managerial tasks. 
 
Thus, our study shows the realization of both the protectionist and the competitive 
models of activity within the organization.  
Recruitment to the post of top management in all cases has a protectionist character – 
loyalty to the enterprise and to the director-general personally turns out to be important criteria 
of selection at both enterprises (which, of course, does not exclude their being professionals, but 
it certainly limits the opportunity of vertical ascent for most employees). This type of model for 
employing “top” managers is fully initiated by the directors-general who, on the one hand, want 
to make way for all innovations and, on the other, it helps them feel more secure in the situation 
of the risky Russian capitalism. 
As for the general tendencies of intraorganizational mobility and of transfers to positions 
of linear and medium-level management, in the period when enterprises (1) had to survive, as we 
think, the contest model is clearly discerned. Partly because the benefits that accompanied ascent 
in the mid-1990s were minimal, those who ascended, in essence, were those who were ready to 
work in severe conditions and were loyal to the enterprise. The chances are actually equal. This 
model has been realized in Khimzavod since 2004, when active introduction of new equipment 
puts the employees in practically equal situations – nobody knows how to work with the new 
equipment and the person who shows more interest, flexibility and aptitude towards learning is 
the one who gets promoted. 
This model is partly retained in the following period of adaptation to the market and 
development when the organizational structure is transformed, when initiative is valued and (to a 
lesser degree) experience. But here we see that elements of protectionism come to the fore in 
relation to some employees (it is graphically seen in Mashzavod), because in the period of 
innovations the most important factor is loyalty of the employee to the enterprise and to the top 
management. Here we see a demonstration of the tournament model – those who have shown 
themselves to be the best in their previous work ascend quicker, then they ascend a second time.   27
The protectionist model of mobility is manifested in conditions when there is a deficit in 
the labor market and it is introduced into the personnel policy of factories deliberately. We mean 
here the program of support of young specialists at Mashzavod and the program of personnel 
reserve at Khimzavod. Those categories of personnel that are important for the development of 
the enterprise are being promoted purposefully. The suitable people are taken note of at the 
moment when they are still rank-and-file, thus they are given chances of mobility. At present in 
Mashzavod where the program has been in progress for several years already, we can see 
examples of successful career ascent of young specialists whom the protectionist policy helps to 
keep in the enterprise and helps make them loyal to the factory. At Khimzavod there are as yet 
no examples of career ascent of representatives of the “personnel reserve”, but, obviously, it is a 
question of time, because the program has only just been introduced. 
Analysis of transformations in the personnel management of industrial enterprises in 
conditions of transitional economy lets us suppose that a more justified personnel policy, one 
that strengthens the stability and competitiveness of the enterprise, is one that is based on 
formalized models of management of the internal labor market. 
The situation that was formed in conditions of the 2008 to 2009 crisis at the enterprises 
that we studied proves this to a certain degree. Of course, as we have already said, the position of 
the enterprise is first of all influenced by the specificity of the market, which they work for. But 
both enterprises have at present chosen the strategy of preserving the aims achieved by 
economizing on costs and they are experiencing serious financial hardships. However, reversing 
tendencies in personnel policy are better manifested at Mashzavod. 
At first they shortened the working hours to 6, then the workweek by a day. This 
means that wages fell. Now you can’t get such great amounts. The mood is that, of 
course, now we have the crisis, but the desire to work is still there (Mashzavod). 
In this way we managed without losing in pay. We had one shop that had a 
shortened day, now they have a new schedule, December was very hard, they had it 
changed, now they work normally. Though actually they have managed not to lose 
anything (Khimzavod). 
 
In the conditions of the current crisis the employees of Khimzavod have demonstrated 
their confidence in the stability of their enterprise and in the perspectives of their job security. 
This, as the results of the study have shown, is the main motivator of working activity and 
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